题目：A Cleaner Book after a Closer Look? – Evidences from China on the Effects of Tax Enforcement on Listed Companies' Profits Reporting

时间：2015年12月23日  星期三     12:00 – 14:00

地点：明德主楼714

报告人： 陈晓光

摘要：Does tax enforcement improve listed companies' information disclosure and their corporate governance? Some studies over the past decade claim it does because tax inspectors can play an additional role in auditing account books of a company while collecting taxes. In this study, I argue that it may not necessarily be the case if tax inspectors are not incentivized to audit but to collect tax, and that potential collusion between taxation bureau and tax-paying companies may lead to even worse information disclosure in order to cheat minor shareholders collaboratively. This paper offers causal evidence in this regard by using the abolition of agriculture tax across whole China in 2005 as an exogenous driving force of tax enforcement by local governments. The results suggest that tougher tax enforcement did translate into greater profits over-reporting by listed companies if institutional quality is worse, including both the companies’ internal governance quality such as ownership structure, separation between ownership and control rights, and on the external governance quality such as corruption, local government intervention, and tax administration. The finding provides novel evidence and enriches our understanding of the interplay between tax administration, corporate governance, and stock market regulation.

报告人简介：陈晓光，中国人民大学财政金融学院财政系讲师、西澳大学商学院助理教授。研究兴趣为税收、增长与发展。获伦敦经济学院博士、北京大学博士学位。在《中国社会科学》、《经济研究》、《经济学（季刊）》等重要刊物发表论文多篇。曾获2005年中国留美经济学会年会“邹至庄最佳论文奖”、首届“中金”全国最佳博士论文奖。